ABSTRACT: Using data on U.S. intra-firm and arm's-length imports for 5,423 products and 210 countries, we examine the determinants of the share of U.S. imports that are intra-firm. Three determinants of this share have been proposed: (1) Antràs (2003) focuses on the share of inputs provided by the headquarter firm. We provide added confirmation and further strengthen the empirical findings in Antràs (2003) and Yeaple (2006). (2) In a model featuring heterogeneous productivities, Antràs and Helpman (2004) focus on the interaction between the firm's productivity level and the headquarter's input share. We find very strong support for this determinant. (3) Antràs and Helpman (2006) add to this the possibility of partially incomplete contracting. We find that consistent with the novel prediction of their model, improved contracting of the supplier's inputs can increase the share of U.S. imports that are intra-firm. In short, the data bear out the primary predictions of this class of models about the share of U.S. imports that is intra-firm trade.
Introduction
This volume is the culmination of a rich and recent research agenda into the determinants of intra-firm trade. Unlike the older literature on international trade in the presence of imperfect competition e.g., Helpman and Krugman (1985) , the current literature provides a much more intellectually satisfying notion of what constitutes a firm. It thus provides us with deeper insights into which elements of international trade are done internally to the firm (multinational or intrafirm trade) and which are done outside the boundaries of the firm. Seminal contributions include McLaren (2000) , Antràs (2003 Antràs ( , 2005 , Grossman and Helpman (2002 , 2003 , 2004 , 2005 , and Antràs and Helpman (2004) .
In this paper we are particularly interested in a strand of the literature that examines the relationship between a multinational firm and its supplier. Each contributes a customized input that is non-contractible. As a result, there is a classic hold-up problem and the multinational must decide whether to vertically integrate its supplier or outsource to its supplier. One narrow strand of the literature -the one we will be dealing with -treats the difference between these two organizational forms as the difference between the outside options of the multinational in the event that the hold-up problem cannot be resolved through bargaining. This treatment of the difference between vertical integration and outsourcing originates with Antràs (2003) and appears again in Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2006) . These papers yield three important insights into the determinants of the share of total U.S.
imports that are intra-firm i.e., the share that is imported by U.S. multinationals from their foreign affiliates. First, Antràs (2003) argues that when the U.S. headquarters firm provides the bulk of the non-contractible inputs, underinvestment in inputs is reduced by highly incentivizing the headquarters firm. Vertical integration provides such incentives because it allows the headquarters firm to control at least some of the supplier's inputs even if bilateral bargaining breaks down.
In contrast, when the foreign supplier provides the bulk of the non-contractible inputs, the foreign supplier must be highly incentivized. This is done by outsourcing: outsourcing strips the headquarters firm of any control over the supplier's inputs and thus strengthens the bilateral bargaining position of the supplier. In short, the share of U.S. imports that are intra-firm is increasing in the share of (non-contractible) inputs provided by the U.S. headquarters firm. This logic is a specific instance of the larger property rights approach to the firm e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986) .
The second prediction about the share of total U.S. imports that is intra-firm is developed in Antràs and Helpman (2004) . They start with the well-known fact that firms display heterogeneous productivities e.g., Bernard and Jensen (1997) . Antràs and Helpman (2004) also argue that the fixed costs of producing abroad are lower when outsourcing to a foreign supplier than when using foreign direct investment (vertical integration). Since only the most productive firms capture the market share needed to offset the high costs of vertical integration, not all firms identified by Antràs (2003) as candidates for vertical integration will in fact integrate. Only the most productive will. Thus, the share of U.S. imports that are intra-firm will be large when two conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (i) the share of inputs provided by the headquarters firm is large (as in Antràs 2003) and (ii) firm productivity is high.
The third prediction about intra-firm trade appears in this volume (Antràs and Helpman, 2006) . While Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume that inputs are completely non-contractible, Antràs and Helpman (2006) allow inputs to be partially contractible. This leads to a surprising result. The typical view is that where property rights are strong, outsourcing is more prevalent. Antràs and Helpman (2006) arrive at the opposite conclusion, at least for some parameter values. The logic is simple. As foreign property rights improve so that the supplier's share of non-contractible inputs falls, the party that requires relatively more incentives becomes the headquarters firm. These incentives are provided through vertical integration. Improved property rights leads to internalization! Using data on U.S. intra-firm and arm's-length imports for 5,423 products imported from 210 countries, we examine these determinants of the share of U.S. imports that are intra-firm. Our conclusions mirror the three predictions listed above. (1) In terms of the Antràs (2003) mechanism, we find support for the role of the share of headquarter inputs. This support is stronger than that found in the only two extant empirical studies of the issue, namely, Antràs (2003) and Yeaple (2006) . 1 (2) We find strong support for the Antràs and Helpman (2004) prediction that intra-firm trade is largest where headquarter inputs are important and productivity is high. (3) We also find support for the Antràs and Helpman (2006) prediction about increased internalization due to an improved contracting environment for the supplier's inputs.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4 examine the predictions of Antràs (2003) , 1 Feenstra and Hanson (2005) also provide support for the property-rights approach in an international trade context. Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Antràs and Helpman (2006) respectively. Section 5 concludes.
The Boundary of the Firm and the Role of η (Antràs, 2003)
We begin by reviewing the salient features of the Antràs (2003) model from the perspective of the empirical work to follow. A U.S. firm produces a brand of a differentiated product. Demand is generated by CES preferences. To produce the good, the firm must use two inputs, those produced by the U.S. firm (h for headquarters) and those produced by a foreign supplier (m for intermediates). Output of the final good is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function with two key parameters: a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter θ and the cost share of the input provided by the firm η. Specifically,
(
The two inputs are entirely customized. Customization raises quality to a threshold which allows the final good to be sold to consumers. Unfortunately for the U.S. firm and its foreign supplier, quality is not observable or contractible. This is modelled by assuming that the investments in customization are non-contractible. Equally unfortunate for the firm and its supplier, customization has no value outside of the relationship. Thus, there is a standard hold-up problem.
After the investments in customization have been made there is renegotiation over how the ex post quasi-rents from the relationship will be shared.
Let β be the generalized Nash share of the ex post quasi-rents from the relationship that go to the U.S. firm. The U.S. firm receives this share plus its outside option. The role of the organizational form (vertical integration versus outsourcing) is that it alters the outside option received by the U.S. firm in the event of a bargaining breakdown in the renegotiation stage. What are the various outside options? If there is no agreement the supplier earns nothing, regardless of the organizational form. The outside option is also 0 for the U.S. firm in an outsourcing relationship. However, for a firm that has vertically integrated with its supplier, no agreement means that the firm can still produce some output by 'forcing' its now-disgruntled supplier to do at least some work. Vertical integration is therefore a way for the firm to improve its outside option in the case of bargaining breakdown.
This difference in the firm's outside options under the two organizational forms leads to a trade-off. Vertical integration allows the firm to grab a larger share of the pie, but it leads to a smaller pie because of underinvestment by the supplier. This is modelled mathematically as follows. Let k = V,O subscripts denote the organizational form with V for vertical integration and O for outsourcing. Recall that β is the share of the ex post quasi-rents that goes to the firm.
Let R k be the revenue generated when there is an agreement. If there is no agreement the firm can only sell a portion δ of the final output. With CES preferences and constant markup 1/α, this generates a revenue of δ α R V . Therefore, the firm receives its outside option δ α R V plus a share β of
be the firm's share of revenues under vertical integration. Under outsourcing, the outside option is 0 and the quasi rents are R O so that the firm receives 0
firm's share of total revenues under outsourcing. The upshot of all this is the central result that the organizational form alters the U.S. firm's share of revenue. In particular,
The timing of the game played by the U.S. firm and its foreign supplier is simple. The two match and the U.S. firm chooses the organizational form. Then investments in customized inputs are made. Finally, the initial contract is renegotiated and, if there is agreement, the product is sold.
Both the U.S. firm and the foreign supplier invest and hence each must worry about the other's underinvestment. Where η is large, the surplus generated by the relationship is particularly sensitive to the amount of investment undertaken by the U.S. firm. To reduce the degree of underinvestment by the U.S. firm, the firm must be given a large share of the revenue. This share is largest under vertical integration because β V > β O . This is a specific instance of the Grossman and Hart (1986) property-rights theory of the firm where residual control rights are allocated to the U.S.
firm. In contrast, when η is small, the surplus generated by the relationship is particularly sensitive to the amount of investment undertaken by the supplier. To reduce supplier underinvestment, the supplier must be given a large share of the revenue. Outsourcing accomplishes this because
Proposition 1 of Antràs (2003) shows that there is a unique value of η -call it η c -such that the U.S. firm prefers vertical integration for η > η c and prefers outsourcing otherwise.
Hypothesis 1
The exists a unique cut-off η c with the following property. If η > η c then the firm will vertically integrate with the supplier. If η < η c then the firm will outsource from the supplier.
We will refer to this dependence of organizational form on η as the 'Antràs effect.'
Data Sources
To investigate hypothesis 1 we use data on intra-firm and total trade from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
is intra-firm imports as a share of total U.S. imports of good g.
A drawback of our Census data relative to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on multinationals is that we do not know whether the U.S. importer is the U.S.-owned parent or the foreign-owned affiliate. To address this, we also report results based on a restricted sample of countries. A country is included in the restricted sample if at least two-thirds of intra-firm U.S. imports from the country are imported by U.S. parents. For example, only 3% of U.S. intrafirm imports from Japan are imports by U.S. parents from their foreign affiliates so that Japan is excluded from the restricted sample. Data on intra-firm U.S. imports by country and parent (U.S. Data on the inputs provided by the U.S. firm are from the Bartelsman and Gray (1996) data base. For each U.S. 4-digit SIC industry in 1996, the database provides information on capital K g , employment L g , capital intensity ln K g /L g , nonproduction workers S g , and skill intensity ln S g /L g (as in Berman, Bound and Griliches 1994) . Note that we use 1996 industry-level data, but the trade data are for 2000 and 2005. In translating the HS6 data into 4-digit SIC data we only keep HS6
codes that go into a unique SIC code. As a result, we are left with 370 of the 400+ possible SIC codes.
Examining Hypothesis 1 (Antràs, 2003): Cross-Industry Analysis
Antràs (2003) examined hypothesis 1 using BEA data on intra-firm U.S. imports as a share of total U.S. imports. He related this share to capital intensity, a proxy for η. Following Antràs and
Helpman (2004) we might also want to proxy η by skill intensity. Antràs (2003) worked at the 2-digit SIC level with 28 industries. We start by examining his relationship using the Census data with its 370 industries. In particular, we consider the following cross-industry regression:
where ln K g /L g is capital intensity and ln S g /L g is skill intensity. We estimate equation (3) Estimates of equation (3) we find that skill-intensive industries tend to import more within firm boundaries. In contrast, the Antràs and Yeaple studies find that the share of intra-firm imports tends to be higher in R&D-intensive industries. At our level of industrial disaggregation there are no measures of R&D intensity. It is possible that our skill-intensity variable is picking up the importance of R&D for the integration versus outsourcing decision.
Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates using our restricted sample of exporting countries to construct industry aggregates. The sample consists of countries for which intra-firm U.S. imports are dominated by U.S. parents. As shown, the results are similar to the results for the larger sample, except that the estimated magnitudes of the coefficients are smaller.
3 The results are similar if either capital intensity and skill intensity enter separately in the estimating equation. 4 To remind the reader, the differences between our estimates and those of the Antràs and Yeaple studies are that (1) our data have 370 industries, much more than the 23 used by Antràs and the 51 used by Yeaple and (2) we have import data for 210 exporting countries, much more than the 28 exporters considered by Antràs and the 58 exporters considered by Yeaple. In addition, Yeaple uses only U.S. parents whereas we are forced to include foreign parents. Our restricted sample eliminates most of the foreign parents. Because we report standardized 'beta' coefficients, one can easily assess and compare the magnitudes of the coefficients for the capital and skill measures. The coefficients for capital suggest that a one standard deviation increase in capital results in a .169 to .295 standard deviation increase in the share of intra-firm imports. This is an economically large effect. The estimated coefficient for skill is somewhat smaller, ranging from .105 to .219.
A problem with the above approach is that it assumes that we can aggregate across exporting
countries. Yet as Schott (2004) notes, this may be seriously misleading because an HS6 good produced in a poor country may be very different from an HS6 good produced in a rich country.
To address this, we now turn to a different approach than that of Antràs (2003) and Yeaple (2006) .
Let M Vgc be the value of U.S. intra-firm imports of good g that are imported from country c. Let M Ogc be the corresponding value of arm's-length U.S. imports. Then M Vgc + M Ogc is total U.S.
imports of good g from country c and M Vgc /(M Vgc + M Ogc ) is the intra-firm import share of good g imported from country c. We estimate a regression that pools across industries and countries:
In this regression we control for exporter heterogeneity by allowing for country fixed effects γ c .
Further, g now subscripts HS6 products rather than 4-digit SIC industries. 
Productivity Heterogeneity (Antràs and Helpman, 2004)
Examining the data on intra-firm imports one finds that M Vgc / M Vgc + M Ogc is rarely either 0 or 1 as predicted by the Antràs theory. An obvious explanation is aggregation bias. However, simple versions of aggregation bias are not consistent with the data. For one, Bernard et al. (2005) show that even though only one third of U.S. trade is done within the firm, U.S. multinationals account for 90% of all U.S. trade. Thus, it would seem that individual multinationals trade both within the firm and between firms. Further, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) show that at the 10-digit HS level (HS10), multinationals typically conduct both intra-firm and arm's-length trade, sometimes even to the same destination country. Feinberg and Keane (2006) offer additional evidence on this subject. In their study of trade between U.S. firms and their Canadian affiliates they find the following. Only 12% of these relationships are pure horizontal relationships and only 19% are pure vertical relationships. Fully 69% of these relationships involve two-way trade flows, what calls 'complex integration strategies'. Thus, simple aggregation bias cannot be the entire story. An explanation in terms of heterogeneity seems more likely.
In particular, Antràs and Helpman (2004) introduce productivity heterogeneity in order to generate entirely novel predictions about the determinants of the share of imports that are intrafirm. To this end they append the Antràs framework onto the Melitz (2003) model. Productivity heterogeneity means that θ in equation (1) varies across firm-supplier relationships. Let π k be variable profits for a firm with θ = 1 that uses organizational form k = V,O. Then as is well known, profits for a firm with productivity θ that adopts organizational form k are linear in θ α/(1−α) :
where F k is the fixed costs of offshoring using organizational form k. Antràs (2003) Integration to Outsourcing integrate. Firms to the left will outsource. The tension here is that fixed costs push for outsourcing while the Antràs effect pushes for vertical integration. Since the Antràs effect is greatest for the most productive firms, the Antràs effect dominates for productive firms.
All of this leads to an interesting empirical prediction about the share of U.S. imports that are intra-firm i.e., about M Vgc /(M Vgc + M Ogc ). The share should depend on an interaction of η with θ. When η < η c , we have that M Vgc = 0 so that an increase in θ has no effect on M Vgc /(M Vgc + M Ogc ) = 0. Where η > η c , an increase in θ increases M Vgc /(M Vgc + M Ogc ). This suggests that in industries with firms that tend to have large values of θ we should see a larger share of firms that vertically integrate. Antràs and Helpman (2004) formalize this by assuming that the distribution of productivities θ within an industry is described by the Pareto distribution i.e., by the cumulative distribution function
Note that for the Pareto distribution the mean and variance of θ are increasing in λ. Consider the case where η > η c as in the right-hand panel of figure 1. Antràs and Helpman (2004, page 573) show that an increase in λ (a rise in the mean and variance of θ) leads to a rise in the share of firms that vertically integrate. Empirically, this means a rise in M Vgc /(M Vgc + M Ogc ). On the other hand, when η < η c as in the left-hand panel of figure 1 , an increase in λ has no effect on
Moving to an empirical counterpart of λ, let x θ g be some measure of productivity dispersion in industry g. We will describe x θ g in detail shortly. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Yeaple (2006) use productivity dispersion x θ g as a measure of λ and we follow suit. We can now offer an empirically-oriented hypothesis that comes out of the Antràs-Helpman model.
Hypothesis 2 Assume F V > F O . Let x θ g be the dispersion of θ across firms within industry g.
(a) If η < η c then dispersion does not affect the intra-firm share of imports:
(b) If η > η c then dispersion increases the intra-firm share of imports:
Examining Hypothesis 2 (Antràs & Helpman, 2004)
To construct our measure of productivity dispersion x θ g we follow Helpman et al. (2004) and Yeaple U.S. exports. Let l index the location within the U.S. from which the exports were shipped. We define an industry as an HS6 product g and we define the sales of a notional firm as the exports of an HS10 good v(g) exported from U.S. location l to destination country c. Let X v(g),l,c be these exports. Our measure of productivity dispersion within industry g is just the standard deviation of ln X v(g),l,c :
where V is the variance operator. The variance is calculated across all triplets (v(g),l,c) that feed into HS6 industry g. 6
As a robustness check we also use a second method of constructing the sales of a notional firm.
Since a single firm may export to more than one country, we aggregate across export destinations and define sales of a notional firm as exports X v(g),l ≡ Σ c X (v(g),l,c) . We then construct dispersion
To test hypothesis 2 we estimate how the relationship between productivity dispersion x θ g and intra-firm imports varies with headquarter intensity. We do not expect the second derivative to be linear. It will be 0 when η is small and positive when η is large. As well, we do not know where the cut-off level η c will be. Because of this, we pursue the following estimation strategy. Rank We consider a regression that allows the relationship between dispersion and intra-firm imports to differ by quintile:
The primary coefficients of interest are the γ θη p . Hypothesis 2 states that for low η and hence low p the impact of dispersion should be zero. That is, γ θη p = 0 for low p. Hypothesis 2 also states that for high η and hence high p the impact of dispersion should be positive. That is, γ θη p > 0 for high p. Since we do not know which quintile p contains the cut-off η c we cannot be more precise about what 'low' and 'high' p means. We will let the data answer this.
The equation (9) regression also includes capital intensity, skill intensity, headquarter-intensity dummies (I η gp ) and country fixed effects. In columns 1-3 we measure productivity dispersion using equation (7). In columns 4-7 we measure productivity dispersion using equation (8). In the first column we examine the effect of productivity dispersion averaged across all industries, regardless of their headquarter intensities. That is, we impose that all five γ θη p are equal. The average effect is positive and highly significant.
The estimated coefficient of .09 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the dispersion measure increases the proportion of within-firm imports by 2.9 percentage points. Because our variable of interest x θ g is an industry-specific measure, we include country fixed effects and adjust the estimated standard errors for clustering across countries within each HS6 industry.
In the second and third columns, we allow the effect of dispersion to differ depending on the headquarter intensity of the industries. In column 2 we measure headquarter intensity by skill intensity S g /L g . In column 3 we measure headquarter intensity by capital intensity K g /L g .
Consistent with hypothesis 2 we observe a significant jump in the magnitude of the estimated coefficient when moving from the first quintile to the second quintile. After this the estimated coefficient remains essentially constant. That is, we find that 0 ≤γ θη1 <γ θη2 ≈γ θη3 ≈γ θη4 ≈γ θη5 .
F-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of the equality of any pair of coefficients amongγ θη2 ,γ θη3 , γ θη4 , orγ θη5 . However, F-tests do reject the null hypothesis of equality betweenγ θη1 and either γ θη2 ,γ θη3 ,γ θη4 , orγ θη5 . These results provide dramatic confirmation of hypothesis 2. They also suggest that the η c cut-off is relatively low, somewhere near the first and second quintiles of the distribution of headquarter intensity.
We further examine the robustness of our results in columns 4 to 6 where we report the same results using the alternative measure of productivity dispersion from equation (8). The results using the two different measures of productivity dispersion are very similar.
In the final column of the table, we show that the results are similar when we use our restricted sample of countries. The sample ensures that most of the intra-firm imports are done by firms with U.S. parents. The final column reports estimates using the same specification as in the adjacent column 6. For the other specifications, the restricted sample estimates are also similar to the full sample estimates.
Overall, the evidence from table 3 provides support for hypothesis 2. We find that there is Table 3 . Productivity dispersion as a determinant of the share of intra-firm imports in total imports.
Productivity dispersion Productivity dispersion calculated using X v(g),l,c calculated using X v(g),l
Headquarter intensity measure: (9). The dependent variable is M Vgc /(M Vgc + M Ogc ), the share of U.S. intra-firm imports in total U.S. imports. The unit of observation is an HS6-country pair in 2005. x θ g is a measure of productivity dispersion across 'notional' firms in industry g. For the definition of x θ g see equation (7) for columns 1-3 and equation (8) for columns 4-7. I η gp for p = 1, . . . , 5 is a dummy for whether the industry's headquarter intensity is in the p th quintile of the headquarter intensity distribution. Headquarter intensity is measured by either skill or capital intensity -see the column headings. All regressions include controls for capital intensity ln K g /L g , skill intensity ln S g /L g , five headquarter intensity indicator variables I η gp , and country fixed effects. * * and * indicate significance at the 1 and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. The final column uses the restricted sample that is described in section 2 under 'Data Sources'. indeed a cut-off level of headquarter intensity. For industries with headquarter intensity greater than this cut-off, productivity dispersion increases the share of intra-firm imports. For industries with headquarter intensity below the cut-off, the estimated relationship is much weaker and close to zero. Because the cut-off is quite low, this suggests that the empirically relevant case from Antràs and Helpman (2004) is the high-η specification. Antràs and Helpman (2006) The introduction of partial contractibility offers many new insights, one of which deals with the intra-firm share of U.S. imports M Vgc /(M Vgc + M Ogc ). Antràs and Helpman (2006) 
Partially Incomplete Contracting (Antràs & Helpman, 2006)
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Low contractibility of supplier's inputs.
High contractibility of supplier's inputs. (a) The 'Standard Effect': U.S. production migrates abroad where it is outsourced. This increases arm's-length U.S. imports and thus lowers the intra-firm share of U.S. imports.
(b) The 'Surprise Effect': The most productive outsourcing relationships become vertically integrated into the U.S. firm's organization. For these relationships, intra-firm imports increase at the expense of arm's-length imports, thus raising the intra-firm share of U.S. imports.
2. If η < η c then the intra-firm share of U.S. imports M Vgc /(M Vgc + M Ogc ) = 0 independent of the contractibility of the supplier's inputs.
The surprising effect is, well, surprising. However, once stated the insight is simple. With a better contracting environment for inputs produced by the foreign supplier, it is no longer as important to incentivize the foreign supplier. This makes it relatively more important to incentivize the U.S. firm. Thus, improved contracting abroad leads the U.S. firm to internalize previously outsourced activities. Antràs and Helpman (2006) show that the sum of the standard and surprise effects can push the intra-firm share of U.S. imports either up or down. This means that in a regression of the intra-firm share of U.S. imports on foreign contracting institutions, a positive coefficient indicates that the surprise effect is more important than the standard effect while a negative coefficient indicates the opposite. 8
Examining Hypothesis 3 (Antràs and Helpman, 2006)
In the Antràs and Helpman (2006) measure that is increasing in the completeness of contracts, we use one minus the fraction of inputs that are relationship-specific, which we denote by (1 − z g ).
The relationship-specificity measure from Nunn (2007) provides variation across industries in contractibility, but in Antràs and Helpman's model contractibility varies across industries and countries. We capture variation in contracting across countries using the 'rule of law' variable from the Governance Matters V database (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006) . The variable measures the enforcement of contracts and the overall quality of a country's legal system. The original measure ranges from −2.5 to +2.5 and is increasing in the quality of the contracting environment. We normalize the measure to be between 0 and 1 (like the industry measure z g ) by adding 2.5 and dividing by 5. We denote the normalized variable by r c . 8 An alternative interpretation that one can take from the Antràs and Helpman (2006) model is that improved contracting institutions increase µ S m , but increase µ S h even more. In this case, the standard effect leads to a rise in the intra-firm import share and the surprise effect leads to a fall in the intra-firm import share. In our view, improved contracting for developing countries is best thought of in terms of a disproportional increase in µ S m . We thus ignore this alternative interpretation.
To capture the interaction between the relationship-specificity of industries and the overall contracting environment in the country we use the interaction of the industry and country measures:
This provides a country-and industry-specific measure of contractual completeness that captures in a simple way the notion that both the inherent contractibility of an industry's production process and the overall quality of a country's contracting environment matter. It also captures the intuition that a country's judicial quality matters more in industries with relationship-specific, customized intermediate inputs.
Hypothesis 3 states that in a regression of the intra-firm share of U.S. imports on x µ gc the coefficient should vary across industries. In industries with η < η c the coefficient should be zero.
In industries with η > η c the coefficient should be positive or negative depending on the size of the standard and surprise effects. To model this non-linearity we proceed as in the previous section.
We group industries into five quintiles based on the value η i.e., on the size of industries' skill intensities ln S g /L g or capital intensities ln K g /L g . Let p = 1, . . . ,5 subscripts denote the quintiles and let I η gp be a binary indicator of whether industry g is in quintile p.
We estimate the following equation:
where the (x µ gc · I η gp ) are the five primary regressors and the γ µη1 , . . . , γ µη5 are the corresponding coefficients.
The fact that x µ gc varies across goods and countries allows us to include good fixed effects γ g and country fixed effects γ c . Of course, with these fixed effects included we can no longer test hypotheses 1 and 2, which are about the industry-specific characteristics ln S g /L g , ln K g /L g , and
As well, because of the good fixed effects, the headquarter indicator variables I η gp are subsumed in the industry fixed effects.
Estimates of (11) appear in table 4. 9 Column 1 reports the average relationship between contractual completeness and intra-firm imports across all industries. We find a positive, marginally significant, relationship which implies that the 'surprise effect' slightly dominates the 'standard effect'. Table 4 . Contractual Incompleteness as a determinant of the share of intra-firm imports in total imports.
Full sample Restricted sample
Headquarter intensity measured by: (10) is a measure of contractual incompleteness for industry g in country c. I η gp for p = 1, . . . , 5 is a dummy for whether the industry's headquarter intensity is in the p th quintile of the headquarter intensity distribution. All regressions include HS6 good fixed effects and country fixed effects. Because the contracting regressor is at the NAICS level, standard errors are clustered. * * and * indicate significance at the 1 and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. The restricted sample is described in section 2, 'Data Sources'.
Columns 2 and 3 allow the estimated effects to differ by headquarter intensity. Although, the coefficients are not precisely estimated, the general pattern that emerges is that for low headquarter intensive industries there is no relationship between contractibility and intra-firm imports. For higher headquarter intensive industries, the relationship between contract completeness and intrafirm imports is positive. The relevant cut-off appears to be between the 2nd and 3rd quintiles when headquarter intensity is measured with skill intensity and between the 3rd and 4th quintiles when capital intensity is used.
Columns 4 to 6 report estimates using the restricted sample of exporting countries i.e., the sample dominated by U.S.-owned parents. The results are similar. There appears to be no relationship between contractibility and intra-firm imports in low-headquarter intensive industries, and a positive relationship in high-headquarter intensive industries. Overall, these results are perfectly consistent with Antràs and Helpman's (2006) model. Antràs (2003) proposed that we think of the boundaries of the firm -of the choice between outsourcing on the one hand and vertical integration, foreign direct investment and multinationals on the other -in the property-rights terms of Grossman and Hart (1986) . The central assumption of the Antràs approach is that vertical integration allows the U.S. firm to partially control the customized intermediate inputs produced by its foreign supplier. The central implication is that we should see vertical integration in industries that intensively use the headquarter inputs produced by the U.S. firm. We analyzed this implication using Census data on U.S. intra-firm and arm's-length imports of 5,423 products from 210 countries in 2000 and 2005. As predicted by Antràs we found that skill-and capital-intensive industries have a higher ratio of intra-firm imports to total imports. This is true even after controlling for exporter fixed effects. Our results extend those of Antràs (2003) and Yeaple (2006) who used a much smaller number of industries and countries. Antràs and Helpman (2004) extended the original Antràs model to allow for (a) firm-level heterogeneity in productivities and (b) fixed costs that are higher for vertical integration than for outsourcing. The extension implies that the intra-firm share of U.S. imports will be highest for firms with two characteristics: (1) high headquarter intensity η and (2) high productivity θ. We found very strong evidence to support this implication. Antràs and Helpman (2006) extended their earlier model to allow for partial contractibility of the foreign supplier's inputs. An improvement in contractibility has two effects. The standard effect is that it encourages arm's-length transactions. The surprise effect is that it makes the relative non-contractibility of the U.S. firm's inputs all the more pressing, thus encouraging vertical integration and more intra-firm imports. This surprise effect should only appear for the most productive firms. This is exactly what we found.
Conclusions
In short, this paper provides rich support for the central predictions in Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2006) about U.S. intra-firm imports as a share of total U.S. imports.
Appendix A. Data Description
Data on intra-firm and total trade are from the U.S. Census Bureau. The trade data are at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS6) level for the years 2000 and 2005. Each shipment imported into the United States is accompanied by a form which asks about the value of the shipment, the HS10 code and whether or not the transaction is with a related party i.e., whether or not the transaction is intra-firm or at arm's length.
Two parties are related if one owns at least 6% of the other. There is an oft-used alternative data set on intra-firm trade, namely, the BEA's multinationals database. In the BEA data a 10% ownership stake is used to define intra-firm transactions. However, the BEA data provide two pieces of evidence to suggest that a 6% threshold is large enough to ensure a controlling stake.
First, only five percent of intra-firm BEA imports involve ownership positions of less than 10%. See table 11 in Mataloni Jr. and Yorgason (2006) . Thus, if an ownership position is at least 6% it is likely at least 10%. Second, for a very large proportion of ownership positions in the BEA data, once the position is more than 10%, it is also more than 50%. (Authors' calculations from the BEA data available on the web.) Thus, although the threshold ownership stake is only 6% in our data, it is safe to say that in most cases it is a controlling stake.
The capital intensity ln K g /L g and skill intensity ln S g /L g measures are constructed using data from Bartelsman and Gray (1996) . The data are from the United States in 1996, with industries classified at the 4-digit SIC87 level.
We use U.S. export data to construct productivity dispersion measures Table 6 reports a list of the remaining countries in the sample for which no income data are available. These countries are listed alphabetically in the table. 
